Education plays an important role in determining labor-market performance and returns, with better-educated individuals generally receiving higher earnings. Educational levels of a labor force may also help to explain the trajectory of economic growth in various countries (Becker 1964; Griliches 1970) . In a seminal contribution to understanding this relationship, More recent studies have investigated the extent to which the correlation between educational attainment and earnings is causal (Card 1999). Education may well be endogenous, because, for example, higher inherent ability may lead individuals both to secure more education and to achieve higher earnings. To deal with the endogeneity, some studies have employed twins' data to control for family background and inherent ability. Other studies have used various other measures, such as the institutional features of an educational system, to instrument for individual educational attainment. Several landmark studies that corrected for the endogeneity of education, using datasets from the 1960s and 1970s, concluded that one additional year of schooling in the United States or Europe boosted earnings by 10 percent or more (Card 1999) .
-3 -We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we use differences among provinces in the dates of effective implementation of the compulsory education law to identify the impact of the education law on years of schooling, both overall and among subgroups of the population. 3 We show that the Compulsory Education Law of 1986 raised overall educational attainment in China (by about 0.8 years of schooling) during the 1997-2006 period, and that the impact varied systematically by location and by gender. Second, using the effective implementation dates of the law in different provinces as an instrumental variable, we assess the returns to one additional year of schooling in contemporary China. Our results imply that the overall returns to education are approximately 20 percent per year on average. This value is fairly consistent with, albeit slightly higher than, the returns found in most industrialized economies. Returns differ among subpopulations; they increase after controlling for the endogeneity of education.
Our results are based on detailed micro data from the widely used and publicly available China Health and Nutrition Survey. Since data measurement for education and labor market returns differs across surveys, and a rich variety of micro data is starting to become available for China, further research exploring the robustness of these results in other datasets would be highly valuable.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First we review the previous literature, particularly focusing on research in China and on studies using institutional features of educational systems to control for endogeneity; in the next section we present our estimation strategy, then we detail the data and reports our results. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of how the 1986 China Compulsory Education Law affected education and how our estimates of returns to education compare to those of previous studies in China and in other countries.
-4 - Card's (1999) excellent overall review of previous research on the returns to education focuses on methodological issues and on evidence from empirical studies available at that time, most of which used data from Western countries. This section reviews previous research related to the present study, including those studies using data from China as well as those using features of the educational system as instrumental variables.
Previous Studies of Education's Effect on Earnings

Education and Earnings in China
The premise of compulsory education laws is that requiring a basic level of education improves the well-being of individuals and society, with one of the main channels being the monetary returns from additional years of schooling. Empirically demonstrating this presumed beneficial impact of such laws is important in the context of developing countries like China, where adolescents may find dropping out of school attractive given the opportunity cost of foregone earnings for unskilled labor, and families may doubt whether the government has their best interests in mind when passing the law. Moreover, previous studies have shown that returns to education were at first quite modest in China's reform era, so that families may have been acting rationally by assuming that an additional year of schooling was not worth much.
The wage-compression policies and other institutions of the Maoist era in China suppressed returns to education. Fleisher and Wang (2005) examine the returns to education during the period of 1950-94, and find a declining trend up to the Cultural Revolution in 1966.
Those low returns are also found to persist for at least a decade after the inception of reforms in 1978. The average returns to one extra schooling year in China before the 1990s have been shown to be lower than those in the United States, Europe, and other developed areas. Byron and Manaloto (1990) , using a survey of 800 adults in Nanjing city, Jiangsu Province, find that the returns to an additional year of education in 1986 were less than 4 percent. Johnson and Chow -5 -(1997) also report that the Mincer-type returns to education were only 4.01 percent in rural China and 3.29 percent in urban China, using data from the 1988 Chinese Household Income Project.
Zhiqiang Liu (1998) employs the same dataset to investigate how returns to education differ by level of work experience, finding 3-6 percent differences. Maurer-Fazio (1999) finds that the returns to education in China for young people were slightly higher than those for older people, but the overall returns were still found to be low before the early 1990s.
Low returns to education have also been found in other transitional economies, such as those of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine; but returns increased substantially after the transition to market-based economies in those countries .
As the state-owned enterprises and collective economy in China declined, especially after the early 1990s, the entire economic system transitioned from a centrally planned to a marketoriented economy. With wages increasingly determined by market forces, this economic transition presumably raised the returns to education in China as it did in other transition economies.
A large body of research suggests that during the post-reform period productivity and efficiency became stronger predictors of individuals' earnings in China (Gustafsson and Li 2000; Knight and Song 2003) . Because of education's link to productivity, the returns to education grew in both rural and urban areas. Yang (2004) analyzes panel data from Sichuan province for the period 1985-96 to investigate how education affected farmers' adjustments after economic policy reforms. Yang finds that in rural areas, schooling played a critical role in enabling farmers to respond efficiently to changing market conditions, predominantly by devoting more capital and labor to nonagricultural activities that yield higher returns. These findings are supported by the Zhang, Huang, and Rozelle (2002) study of participation in the labor force, entry into the -6 -labor market, and wages in rural Jiangsu households in 1988 Jiangsu households in , 1992 Jiangsu households in , and 1996 . In that study, the authors find that rural individuals with more education are not only more likely to benefit from rising opportunities off the farm, but also to obtain better returns from on-farm activities compared to their less-educated counterparts. Yang (2005) uses data from urban regions of the Chinese Household Income Project to compare returns to education in 1988 and 1995. He finds that the estimated rate of return to one additional year of schooling increased from 3.1 percent in 1988 to 5.1 percent in 1995.
Nevertheless, throughout the mid-1990s, wage differences by occupation, level of skill, and level of education remained very narrow in China compared to other transition economies (Psacharopolous and Patrinos 2004) . Researchers have attempted to determine why, during this period when educated labor was scarce, the returns to education were not commensurate with its contribution to productivity. Based on panel data from 200 large rural enterprises in ten provinces, Fleisher and Wang (2004) attribute the low private returns to education in China in the mid-1990s to restrictions on worker mobility along with unexploited economies of scale in production among rural enterprises. These findings support the idea that returns to education reflect the extent to which wage rates are allowed to reflect differences in productivity (Fleisher and Wang 2005) .
Beginning in the late 1990s, returns to education in China appear to have experienced a broad and sustained rise. occurred across all groups of workers-whether defined by gender, experience, region, or firm ownership-and was robust to adding other control variables. Appleton, Song, and Xia (2005) use recall panel data from the China Household Income Project from 1988 to 2002 to examine -7 -the impact of worker characteristics on urban wages in China during a period of industry reform and ownership restructuring. Based on their cross-sectional Mincerian wage functions and fixedeffects panel estimates of changes in the wage structure over time, they conclude that the increase was greater in China (from 3 percent in 1988 to 5 percent in 2002) than in other (OECD) countries during this period. They attribute the sustained rise in returns to several potential demand-side factors, including a competitive labor market, skill-biased technological change, and increased trade. They also identify several supply-side explanations for the increased returns to schooling, including the liberalization of controls on migration, which increased the supply of predominantly low-skilled workers in urban areas and moderated the increase in their wages, thus raising the returns to education. Appleton Song, and Xia (2005) stress that, according to their fixed-effects estimation, the rise in the returns to education in the panel data cannot be explained by an increase in the quality of education.
The documented increase in returns to education since the 1990s in China underscores the potentially important role of the compulsory education law in improving welfare for those on the margin of not completing a middle school education. Even if such individuals correctly understood the returns to education at the time schooling decisions were made in the 1970s and 1980s, they may not have foreseen the rise in returns that would occur after they entered the labor market. Especially if returns to education diminish at higher levels, those individuals most tempted to drop out of school to take up low-skill factory wages are precisely the ones who would most benefit from compulsory education; their future earnings will be significantly higher with a few more years of education and will accumulate over their work life to far exceed the earnings they forego by staying in school.
-8 - Li (2003) argues that the returns to education for the more educated population in China, such as those with education beyond college, are higher than previous studies have shown. After correcting for reporting errors and ability heterogeneity, the estimated returns to education for a subsample of young workers are approximately 15 percent per year using data from the 1995 Chinese Household Income Project (Li and Luo 2004) . This estimated rate of return to education in China is roughly comparable to that in Western developed countries. Heckman and Li (2004) study the returns to college education using data from the 2000 China Urban Household Investment and Expenditure Survey, also correcting for heterogeneity and selection bias. They find that a four-year college education raises annual income by 43 percent, arguing therefore that the returns to one additional year of college education average about 11 percent.
Not all studies find that the returns to education in China really increased dramatically. Li et al. (2005) find contradictory evidence. Using identical twins' data from five cities in 2002, they find that a large portion of the observed returns to education reflect ability bias. After employing the twins' fixed-effects estimation, the returns to education decrease from 8.4 percent to 2.7 percent; Li et al. (2005) argue that this low rate of return is due to the inefficient education system in China. Moreover, these results using twins' data in China are at variance with higher rates found by studies using twins' data in other countries (e.g. Ashenfelter and Rouse,1998) .
This suggests that the method of analysis does not explain the discrepancy. It also suggests that selective education according to ability may play a larger role in China than elsewhere.
Finding an appropriate instrument for education
Given the widely acknowledged endogeneity of educational attainment, it is important to find instruments to control for this phenomenon. Angrist and Krueger (1991) use the specific -9 -quarter of the year of an individual's birth as the instrument for his or her education, finding that individuals born earlier in the year have slightly less schooling than those born later in the same year. The likely explanation is that individuals born earlier in the year can attain the minimum legal age for leaving school at a lower grade. Their empirical analysis shows that the instrumental variables (IV) estimates of returns to education are slightly higher than those estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) (increasing from 7 percent to 10 percent), but these differences are not statistically significant. Staiger and Stock (1997) re-analyze Angrist and Krueger's data, using limited-information maximum-likelihood methods, and find similar results.
Economists hypothesize that the distance to school may determine an individual's educational achievement, thus serving as a potential instrument. Growing up near a high school, college, or university may have a positive effect on an individual's educational attainment (Card 1995; Kane and Rouse 1993) . The returns to education found from these school-proximity IV estimations are more than 50 percent higher than those using OLS. Harmon and Walker (1995) study the returns to education using British data. The minimum age at which individuals were allowed to leave school in Britain was raised from 14 to 15 in 1947 and from 15 to 16 in 1973. Based on these institutional changes in the British schooling system, Harmon and Walker construct three cohort dummies: men born before 1932, men born between 1933 and 1957, and men born after 1957. Using these cohort dummies as instruments, Harmon and Walker find that returns to education based on OLS (6 percent) are underestimated compared to those in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) model (15 percent), producing results similar to those found by other studies using instrumental variables for education.
-10 -
Estimation Strategy
A change in China's laws enabled us to find an appropriate instrument for educational attainment. China's Compulsory Education Law was passed on April 12, 1986, and officially went into effect on July 1, 1986 . This was the first time that China used a law to specify educational policies for the entire country. However, provinces were allowed to have different effective dates for implementation, since the central authorities recognized that not all provinces would be ready to immediately enforce the law.
This law had several important features (China Ministry of Education 1986). First, nine years of education became compulsory. Second, children were generally supposed to start their compulsory education at six years of age. Third, in principle, compulsory education was free of charge. Fourth, it became unlawful to employ children who are in their compulsory schooling years. Fifth, local governments were allowed to collect education taxes to finance compulsory education.
There are two significant differences between China's Compulsory Education Law and its counterparts in the United States and UK, which have been the focus of much of the previous literature on compulsory education. First, China's per capita income at the time of implementation was much lower than recent per capita income in the United States and UK. In addition, fiscal decentralization implemented around the same time reduced the central government's redistributive power, 4 leaving many local governments in poor provinces or regions with insufficient resources to fully implement the law (Hannum 2003; Zhang and Kanbur 2005) . 5 These factors suggest that the effectiveness of this program in achieving educational gains was almost certain to be uneven across China. Second, China's law stipulates nine years of compulsory education instead of setting a minimum age for leaving school (although children cannot legally leave school if they are less than 15 years old). Those under 15 who had already -11 -left school by the law's effective date were required by the local education system to return to school until they turned 15. Local government and education officials are held responsible for school enrollment rates, and their promotions may be delayed as a punishment for low enrollment. However, the compulsory schooling law has been unevenly enforced in different parts of the country. Therefore, one of our main objectives is to use the actual effective date of implementation in each province to demonstrate that the law did impact educational attainment for those on the margin of completing nine years of schooling. Then we use this impact as a method to estimate returns to education in contemporary China.
Our estimation strategy exploits the fact that, as of the law's effective date, a Chinese child was supposed to have begun primary school upon reaching six years of age. In this way, the child was supposed to complete compulsory education at 15 years of age. Children over 15 years old when the law became effective were not affected by the law and, thus, serve as our comparison group.
The staggered implementation of China's compulsory education law created a series of natural experiments. The effective date of the law's implementation in the province of residence will serve as our instrumental variable for estimating each individual's completed years of schooling. This obviates the problem of endogeneity due to unobservable variables that are correlated with both education and earnings (Card 1999) . While an individual's inherent ability is generally unobservable, it should be expected to affect both education and earnings positively, as higher-ability individuals tend to obtain more education and higher incomes. If so, OLS estimation will overestimate the returns to schooling, although Griliches (1977) and Angrist and Krueger (1991) argue that the ability biases in OLS estimations are relatively small.
-12 -OLS may also underestimate returns to education (Card 1999; Staiger and Stock 1997) . Card (1999) suggests that the instrumental-variable estimates based on compulsory education laws may reveal higher returns to schooling than those estimated by OLS because individuals impacted by compulsory education laws typically have marginal returns to schooling that are higher than average. Many of the previous studies using educational-system features as instruments report such higher returns-higher by 30 percent or more compared to returns estimated with OLS without controlling for endogeneity (Card 1999 ).
As noted, China's Compulsory Education Law serves as our instrument to address the endogeneity of years of schooling. We proceed as follows. First, following a standard Mincer (1974) analysis, we assume that the natural logarithm of individual earnings is a function of schooling years and other explanatory variables: The first stage estimates years of schooling as follows: We pursue a two-stage least-squares estimation employing this instrumental variable. For this analysis, we define a treatment cohort of all individuals aged less than 15 years on the law's effective date in their home province, and a control cohort of all individuals aged 15 or older on the law's effective date. One basic strategy is to contrast the outcomes for these overall treatment and control cohorts. This strategy is similar to those used by Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Harmon and Walker (1995) .
One concern with our instrumental variable strategy is that a time trend may also be affecting individual earnings. If this is true, it is possible that the treatment cohort may have higher earnings and/or better education than the control cohort simply because they came along -14 -later. Such a concern would be grave for one of two reasons: 1) if the study data spanned a long time period; or 2) if the country experienced rapid economic growth during this period. Since our time period is relatively short, the former is not really a concern.
However, China's economy was growing rapidly during this period. To overcome this potential concern, we employ a more refined estimation procedure that defines treatment and control groups that are similar in age. Specifically, we compare a two-year treatment cohort (aged 13 and 14 on the law's effective date) to a two-year control cohort (aged 15 and 16 on the law's effective date). Within these two-year treatment and control cohorts, the time trends that we are concerned about will, by definition, be much smaller than for the overall sample. We choose two years for the following reasons. First, one year's data would provide a smaller sample size. Second, our approach enables us to test on either side of the dividing line, to see whether there is considerable growth in education between two successive years in either the two-year treatment cohort or the two-year control cohort. Consistent with the latter approach, we test year dummies within these two-year treatment and two-year control cohorts.
If China's Compulsory Education Law is a valid instrument for educational attainment, the two-year treatment cohort will have significantly higher educational attainment than the twoyear control cohort. However, a dummy variable for the second year within each of these twoyear treatment or control cohorts will not explain differences in schooling, even if a year-trend effect exists. In other words, a dummy variable for being age 16 (the second year of the two-year control cohort) should not affect schooling within the control cohort; similarly, a dummy variable for being age 14 of the two-year treatment cohort should not affect schooling within the treatment cohort.
-15 -A further robustness check involves testing for the effects of "placebo laws," counterfactually assuming the law was enforced two years earlier or two years later than it was actually enforced in a given province. If our instrument is valid, we should find no effects for these two different hypothetical law years. Any differences would only reflect a time trend, and these counterfactual year dates should fail tests for being a valid instrument for education. In the two-stage least-squares estimation, we also employ an exclusion test of the instrumental variable to identify whether the instrumental variable has no direct effect on the earnings measure when controlling for all other explanatory variables.
Data and Variables
Data
We use data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which is maintained at The CHNS employed sophisticated sampling techniques. A multistage, random cluster process was used to draw the sample surveyed in each of the provinces. Counties in the nine provinces were stratified by income (low, middle, and high), and a weighted sampling scheme was used to randomly select four counties within each province. In addition, the provincial capital and a lower-income city were selected when feasible. Villages within the counties, and urban and suburban neighborhoods within the cities, were chosen at random.
The effective dates of the China Compulsory Education Law differed by province, as provincial governments had first to enact specific regulations (equivalent to provincial laws) before the law was enforced in that province. For the nine provinces in the CHNS data, the actual effective dates are July 1, 1986, in Heilongjiang and Liaoning; September 9, 1986, in Jiangsu; September 12, 1986, in Shandong; October 1, 1986, in Henan; March 1, 1987, in Hubei; January 1, 1988, in Guizhou; and September 1, 1991, in 
Descriptive statistics
We employ two levels of analysis. The first level comprises all the people who were born in 1961 or later as the "All" sample. The second level moves to our restricted cohorts of people aged 13, 14, 15, and 16 by the law's effective dates in the various provinces. The restricted cohorts are more homogenous, and the year-trend effects are minimal. forces impact individual income, including age and experience in the labor force. Since the treatment cohort is, by definition, younger and come along later than the control cohort, average earnings may be higher or lower depending on whether greater age outweighs income growth over time. In our data, the treatment cohort is approximately ten years younger than the control cohort, and this factor may work to reduce the average yearly earnings of the treatment cohort relative to the control.
[Insert Table 5 .1] [Insert Table 5 .2]
Results
Researchers are also interested in knowing the differential impact of compulsory schooling by gender, urban versus rural residence, and inland versus coastal location. For example, a stronger impact for girls might be expected, since lower overall schooling implies that more girls than boys would be on the margin of being impacted by the law. Whether compulsory schooling would raise schooling more in rural or urban areas is less clear, given several countervailing forces. First, urban areas are more likely to have enforced the law strictly on the legally effective date. Second, given their higher quality of schools, families in urban -20 -areas may have been more likely to comply, thus reducing the costs of enforcement compared to rural areas. However, rural areas are home to more children on the margin of dropping out of junior high school, and therefore the requirement of nine years of education would have a higher impact in rural areas for a given enforcement level. A similar set of forces may have shaped the effectiveness of the compulsory education law among inland and coastal provinces, with enforcement in the less-developed inland provinces more likely compromised by lower-quality governance (higher enforcement costs), lower-quality schools, and more limited local opportunities for returns to education.
As Table 5 .3 shows, the OLS estimation of the first stage regression using our instrumental variable finds that the marginal effects of the compulsory education law are highly significant and positive for each of the different subsamples. The various tests of our instrumental variable shown in table 5.3 ensure its validity. We find that the law increases years of schooling for all subgroups, but most strongly for girls (1.17 years) rather than for boys (0.4 years). The law also increases years slightly more strongly in rural (compared to urban) and coastal (compared to inland) areas.
[Insert We turn next to estimating the returns to education. Table 5 .4 shows that without addressing endogeneity (that is, using OLS) in the entire sample, one additional year of schooling increases individual annual earnings by 9 percent. Using our IV in 2SLS, the marginal effect becomes 20 percent. This result of higher estimated returns when controlling for endogeneity is consistent with previous studies that use the features of schooling systems as instruments (Angrist and Krueger 1991; Card 1999; Harmon and Walker 1995) . The -21 -magnitude-20 percent estimated returns-is slightly higher than the magnitudes found in those previous studies, which focus on more developed countries.
[Insert table 5.4]
The results in table 5.5 show that our instrument remains valid even when using four years of data, as we did with the two-year control cohort and two-year treatment cohort. For this more narrowly defined sample, the marginal effect is 9 percent with OLS (significant at the 1 percent level) and 26 percent using 2SLS (also significant at the 1 percent level). Further validation of our identification strategy comes from the fact that the 2SLS coefficients are not statistically significant either within the two-year control cohort or within the two-year treatment cohort. This result is not surprising, given that the series of statistical tests reported in table 5.2 reveals that a year dummy within these two-year control or two-year treatment cohorts is not a good instrument for educational attainment.
[Insert In the OLS estimation, the returns to an additional year of schooling (8-9 percent) are the same in rural and urban areas, but after correcting for the endogeneity of years of schooling in the two-stage least squares estimation, the marginal effect rises to 18 percent for rural areas and only 14 percent for urban areas.
-22 -Turning to inland and coastal differences, we find that with OLS estimation, the marginal effect of one additional year of schooling is 9 percent for both inland provinces and coastal provinces. After addressing endogeneity with 2SLS, the marginal effect for coastal provinces increases to 37 percent, and that for inland provinces moves only slightly higher to 12 percent.
As a final sensitivity test, we examine two "placebo" (or hypothetical) law years, one prior to the actual compulsory education law and one after the law went into effect. By definition, the law was not implemented in these "placebo" years. For example, in no province was the law implemented in 1984. If our results are truly capturing the impact of the compulsory education law rather than a time trend, results should not also appear for a placebo year like 1984. We first make the counterfactual assumption of implementation two years after the actual effective date for a given province. To do so, we examine a sample of individuals aged 15 and 16 on the law's actual effective date (cohort 1) compared to a sample aged 17 and 18 on the law's actual effective date. We find that a dummy variable for cohort 2 does not affect educational attainment.
Thus, a placebo law of two years earlier shows no significant effect. These results are reported in Similarly, we study a sample of individuals whose birth dates make them the first four years of students after the compulsory education law went into effect. These two cohorts of youths include those aged 11 and 12 by the law's effective date (cohort 3) and those aged 13 and 14 by the law's effective date (cohort 4). We find that a dummy variable for being in cohort 4 affects education, but its coefficient is only 0.25. In addition, this instrument cannot pass the weak-instrument test, and the F statistic in the first stage is only 3.65 (much less than 10). Thus, although there does appear to be a year trend of increasing education within the two two-year -23 -cohorts immediately following the compulsory education law, an instrument based on being born in cohort 4 is not valid. These placebo-law results-employing the same strategy as we did with our main results-show no significant impact of a counterfactual "law" either two years earlier or two years later than the actual first enforcement of the law. These results offer reassurance that our 2SLS results in table 5.4 are capturing the impact of the actual compulsory education law.
Discussion and Conclusion
In the early 1960s one-third of Chinese were illiterate; now, fewer than 5 percent are (Peng 2011) . In 1986 China's central government passed a law requiring nine years of education, and over the subsequent several years, provincial authorities began enforcing compulsory education in their localities. By 2010 China had 8,930 college graduates for every 100,000
people, with about 120 million having a college degree (Peng 2011) . A comparatively educated labor force has been singled out as one important determinant of China's unprecedented economic growth since the early 1980s. Yet, to date, no study has definitively shown whether the 1986 Compulsory Education Law played a causal role in China's substantial increases in education, and whether the law benefited the individuals whom it compelled to stay in school, by yielding significant returns at the individual level. China's case also has broad implications for understanding the role of education in economic development and whether returns to education in a globalized world have converged toward similar levels.
In this study, we test whether the China Compulsory Education Law of 1986 raised educational attainment overall and in specific subpopulations. We then use the phased implementation of compulsory education across provinces as an instrument to estimate the returns to each additional year of schooling in contemporary China.
-24 -Our first main finding is that the law increased years of schooling by about 0.8 years on average, with slightly higher effects for rural and coastal areas, compared to urban or inland areas. These results may reflect the interplay of many factors, including the fact that enforcement of the law was probably least stringent in precisely those regions where the most people could benefit from such a law, that is, in less developed rural areas. The compulsory education law also increased years of schooling strikingly more for girls (1.17 years) than for boys (0.4 years).
Our second main result is that, as China transformed from a socialist planned economy to a market-oriented economy, its returns to education rose to meet those found in established market economies around the globe. Using the effective implementation date of the law in each province as an instrumental variable to control for endogeneity of schooling, we estimate that the overall returns to schooling are approximately 20 percent for one additional year of schooling.
This estimate is fairly comparable with-albeit somewhat higher than-the double-digit returns found in most Western countries. These higher returns might be expected in a rapidly growing economy when there are diminishing returns to additional years of schooling; those affected by the compulsory schooling law are on the lower range of the schooling distribution and have higher-than-average returns to an additional year of schooling (Card 1999) . Because of the law, those individuals are better equipped to move from unskilled to semi-skilled jobs as the economy develops.
12
We also report results exploring how returns to education vary by gender, by urban vs.
rural regions, and by inland vs. coastal provinces. We find that the estimated returns to schooling are significantly higher for men (50 percent) than for women (10 percent), and higher for individuals from rural and coastal areas than from other areas of China.
-25 -
The striking gender difference in returns could arise from several factors. With more boys than girls already completing middle school education before the law, the first stage impact was lower for boys than girls. The boys affected by the compulsory schooling law were even lower in the range of the male schooling distribution than the girls were in the female schooling distribution. The men would therefore be expected to have higher-than-average returns to an additional year of schooling. Higher labor market returns to schooling for men probably are also related to lingering differences in the occupations and wages for women relative to men in China, consistent with existing literature (Liu, Meng, and Zhang 2000; Rozelle et al. 2002) showing a gender gap in employment opportunities and earnings. 13 Although higher returns might therefore be expected for men, the large magnitude of the difference we found suggests that our instrumental variable approach has limits for estimating the more generalizable difference in returns to education by gender, which merits further research.
Highly educated people in rural China are scarcer than in urban China, so the returns to education would be expected to be higher in the rural areas. We estimate that the higher rural returns are concentrated mostly in coastal rather than inland rural areas. These higher returns for coastal provinces may reflect overall "better governance," including better enforcement of the law (consistent with the first-stage results in table 5.3), as well as better transport infrastructure and more vibrant off-farm economies that would facilitate employment for those with sufficient schooling. Lack of any statistically significant returns to education in inland provinces may arise because the inland areas suffer from lower-quality schools (a factor not evaluated here).
Moreover, with constraints on inter-provincial permanent migration, the increase in population with junior high school education could have begun to saturate the market for low-skill industrial workers in inland areas, depressing the wages relative to more skilled (senior high school and -26 -above) workers. Further study, with controls for school quality, should investigate this geographic difference in returns to education and our conjectured explanations.
We employed numerous sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of our results.
Nevertheless, several limitations of the present study should be noted. First, we employ a threshold date as the instrument for education, but we know that not all regions within the same provinces implemented the new law equally and immediately, and we cannot completely rule out a year-trend effect. Second, the China Health and Nutrition Survey data only cover nine provinces, and thus is not nationally representative. Our results do not generalize to all of China.
Moreover, the measurement of educational attainment (by reporting completed levels of schooling or years of education) and of labor market returns differs across datasets, so it would be useful to explore the robustness of using the Compulsory Education Law as IV in other datasets. Third, the cohorts impacted by the 1986 China Compulsory Education Law are still relatively young, and we are unable to look at the returns to education over a lifetime of earnings.
Fourth, the treatment and control cohorts are not homogenous in terms of age, although our twoyear restricted cohorts were employed to minimize this limitation. Fifth, the CHNS data precludes separately identifying migrants from rural to urban areas (either temporary or permanent); China's urbanization has been rapid, and the returns to education for migrant workers may be different. Moreover, some of their gains may be due to migration to higher-wage areas, as a byproduct of seeking education, rather than due to the education itself. Sixth, the power of our instrumental variable is probably reduced by the uneven implementation of the compulsory schooling laws.
The present study provides updated results to the literature regarding returns to education the Chinese Communist Party on the Reform of the Educational System, devolving educational responsibility to lower levels of government. This reform increased inequality of funding between rural and urban schools, leading rural schools to diversify the sources of their funding.
These diverse sources included school fees, levies, school-and community-generated revenues (Hannum 2003; Tsang 2000) . Just one year later, the Compulsory Education Law officially made nine years of schooling compulsory throughout China, with implementation to be carried out in different phases (Hawkins 2000) . The reforms must be discussed together because, despite the compulsory education law mandating 9 years of education, children whose families could not pay some fees (such as textbooks) were not allowed to attend school (Brown and Park 2002 ).
-34 - 5 For example, all areas were expected to have primary education available for all students after 1986, but in reality, only 76 percent of counties had realized universal primary education by 1990 (Connelly and Zheng 2003) . 6 For example, urban social safety net policies only cover households registered as urban in that locality, and children of migrant workers usually cannot attend urban public schools. During the period of our study, children of migrants sometimes attended schools specifically set up for migrants, but such children have always been required to return to their household registration locality to take the tests for progression to higher levels of schooling.
7 Other studies also have this potential problem of large political disruptions in schooling; the Harmon and Walker (1995) study, for example, includes students impacted by World War II.
8 These incomes from business, farming, gardening, fishing, and/or raising livestock are often at the household level and these economic activities are run by the entire household. CHNS allocates these household-based incomes to individual members according to the hours that individuals spend on those economic activities as a proportion of the total hours spent by the entire household for the same type of economic activities.
9 Health has been found to affect income significantly in China (Liu, Dow, Fu, Akin, and Lance 2008) , but our estimation without controlling for self-reported health status shows a similar trend as reported in the paper. The results without controlling for health are available from the authors upon request.
10 Earlier data from CHNS 1989-1993 are not used in this study. Very few observations that encompassed the period of educational reform were included in that earlier data, since the Chinese Compulsory Education Law was not enforced until 1986. CHNS is an unbalanced panel -35 -data set, so the same individual may appear in more than one wave of the data. We have used a sample weight variable in the estimation to control for this issue as weighted estimation.
11 Our estimates also reveal that controlling for endogeneity of education reduces the returns to being male and the returns to age/experience, although both are still quite significant in explaining higher earnings. Controlling for endogeneity also reduces the roles of health, province, and wave of data in explaining variation in earnings.
12 Our estimate also is approximately double the returns to schooling estimated by OLS without controlling for endogeneity. Previous studies have often shown that the returns to education by IV estimation are larger than those by OLS estimation, and the results in the present study are consistent with this literature. For example, Trostel, Walker, and Woolley (2002) estimate the economic returns to education for 28 countries. They find that correcting for the endogeneity of education using various instrumental variables increases the estimated returns to education by more than 20 percent, compared to those estimated by OLS. 13 Women's overall employment rates declined in the reform era (compared to very high female labor-force participation in the Mao era). In addition, our sample is relatively young, so that the women are concentrated in their child-bearing years and may suffer an earnings loss compared to the control group of women who are older and mostly past their child-bearing years. (Recall that the average age of the treatment group is 24.7 years old, compared to 35.6 for the control cohort; see Table 1 .) A larger allocation of family business earnings to men than to women could also be playing a role in the large gender difference in returns.
14 Heckman and Li (2004) The control cohort includes respondents that were not affected by the 1986 China Compulsory Education Law, and the treatment cohort includes respondents that were affected by the 1986 China Compulsory Education Law. The effective dates of the 1986 China Compulsory Education Law in the different provinces varied. We define the sample so that a treatment respondent was less than 15 years old on the law's effective date in the province where he or she lived, and a control respondent was 15 years or older on the effective date. c Chi-square tests for categorical variables and students' t tests for continuous variables between the control cohort and treatment cohort. N/A: not applicable. 10.69*** 9.98*** 0.40 0.03 * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 0.43 *** (0.04) 0.28 *** (0.10) Constant 3.24 *** (0.28) 2.64 *** (0.48) * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. b Using the instrumental variables as those in Table 3 for various study cohorts respectively. Selected results by gender, urbanization, and province location (the "All" sample)
The dependent variable is the annual income in natural log Coastal provinces 0.09 *** (0.01) 0.37 *** (0.12) * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
